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Abstract: This paper examines policy effectiveness as a function of leader identity. We 
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affirmative action for minorities reverses this result, while intergroup contact improves the 
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We examine the role of leader identity in influencing economic outcomes and policy 
effectiveness in societies marked by social diversity.  In a sharp departure from previous work on 
leader identity that focuses upon leader preferences and actions, we use a field experiment to 
isolate the role of citizen reactions, uncovering a new mechanism by which leader identity 
influences economic outcomes. We further show that citizen reactions to leader identity influence 
the success of affirmative action and intergroup contact, policies designed to empower or integrate 
minority groups. We also demonstrate that the success of identity-based policies varies with the 
history of conflict between the two groups, a result that is relevant to many post-conflict settings. 
The outcome we investigate is economic coordination.1 Coordination can be critical to 
resolving collective action problems and market failures. It has been shown to be important for 
conflict prevention, halting the transmission of viruses, changing social norms, escaping poverty 
traps, optimizing resource use on common land, and raising the provision of public goods.2 While 
coordination problems are rife in most societies, they are of particular importance in developing 
countries where formal institutions to coordinate individual actions are weak and externalities from 
infectious disease or pollution are large. In the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, the site of our study, 
previous work has observed that citizens fail to coordinate on simple tasks of community value 
such as sanitation or the timing of the planting of crops, with severe welfare consequences (Dreze 
and Gazdar, 1997; Dreze and Sharma, 1998). 
 
1 Coordination is distinct from cooperation as measured, say, in public goods games. Cooperation 
relies on voluntary contributions by individuals, driven by prosocial motivations such as altruism 
or trust, or specific strategies such as conditional cooperation. Coordination, on the other hand, 
relies on individually rational (self-interested) choices to collectively act to achieve a common 
goal, which may or may not result in Pareto-superior outcomes. 
2 See Schelling, 1980; Coleman, 1987; Kremer, 1993; Hoff, 2000; Hoff and Stiglitz, 2001; Adda, 
2016; Bowles and Halliday, 2020. Global public goods can be characterized as having weakest-
link properties and so being susceptible to coordination failure (Sandler, 1998; Nordhaus, 2006).  
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Using observational data to identify the impact of leader identity on coordination is difficult. 
First, leader identity is typically not randomly assigned and will tend to be correlated with citizen 
preferences. Second, with observational data there is no straightforward way of disentangling the 
effects of leader preferences from those of citizen reactions. Third, it can be difficult to obtain 
secondary data on coordination outcomes. 
To overcome these issues, we implement a large laboratory-style experiment in a field setting 
in India, and experimentally vary the religious identity of the leader. We use a weakest link 
coordination game, as in Brandts and Cooper (2006). This is similar to a 5x5 stag hunt game with 
multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria, in which individual payoffs depend positively upon the 
minimum effort in the group and negatively on own effort. Coordination is measured as the 
minimum level of effort achieved in the group. In most settings, coordination tends to occur at the 
lowest effort level, in a Pareto-inefficient equilibrium. Leaders can potentially create a shift to a 
better equilibrium by proposing a (non-binding) effort level. We conducted the game with 1028 
participants in mixed-religion groups, across 44 towns in India’s largest state of Uttar Pradesh. 
Our sample includes Muslims, a religious minority in India, and Hindus, the religious majority.   
To guide interpretation of our findings, we develop a stylized theoretical framework that allows 
for two types of individuals--rational types, who simply maximize their economic payoff in the 
game, and behavioral types, who additionally respond to leader identity. The model predicts that 
minimum group effort will vary with leader identity if the expected fraction of behavioral types 
differs by citizen identity; individual choices are also guided by beliefs about how others will 
respond to leader identity.  
Our main finding is that the introduction of Muslim leaders increases minimum group effort 
by 31%, coordinating group outcomes to a Pareto-superior equilibrium, while the introduction of 
Hindu leaders has no significant impact on coordination. This result is robust to the inclusion of 
town fixed effects and to several specification checks. This novel finding identifies a potential gain 
in aggregate output associated with having minority leaders and establishes the relevance of social 
identity to coordination outcomes. 
Investigating mechanisms, we show, consistent with our theoretical framework, that the 
coordination outcome is primarily driven by citizen reactions. In particular, minority citizens are 
more responsive to leader identity than majority group citizens, and majority group citizens 
anticipate this. Thus identity moderates behavior and, once coordination is involved, beliefs over 
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the behavior of other members of the group matter. We rule out other possibilities: we establish 
that higher coordination under Muslim leaders does not arise from their proposing higher effort (a 
proxy for leader preferences), or from a perception that Muslims are more competent leaders, or a 
perception that Muslim leaders themselves supply higher effort.  
The results discussed thus far describe reactions to leader identity in the control arm. We extend 
the analysis by randomizing two policy treatments designed to improve social integration, namely 
affirmative action and intergroup contact, offering the first analysis of these policies in the same 
experimental setting. Towns were randomly assigned to either treatment or control arms, and half 
the groups were randomly assigned to have Muslim leaders within each town.  
In the affirmative action (AA) treatment arm, participants were told that the leadership position 
was subject to a quota system, and group members with a Muslim leader were informed that their 
leader is in a reserved position, while groups with a Hindu leader knew that their leader was not in 
a reserved position. We find that our main result is reversed under AA: coordination improves 
under Hindu but not Muslim leaders. This is most likely because the AA treatment makes salient 
for the Hindu majority that the Muslim minority is being favored, and this primes Hindu identity. 
We verify this by showing that individual effort levels of Hindus increase under Hindu relative to 
Muslims leaders. This result demonstrates that citizen reactions to leader identity can play a large 
role in the success or failure of quotas.  
We facilitated intergroup contact by having mixed-identity groups collaborate in solving a 
puzzle before the coordination game was played. We find that this improves coordination in groups 
led by leaders of both religions, and more so in Hindu-led groups. Indeed, this difference 
counterbalances the control group difference so that, following intergroup contact, Hindu and 
Muslim leaders achieve similar levels of coordination. This is consistent with identity becoming 
salient after contact with a member of the other religion, and more so among majority group 
members, possibly because they have more limited exposure to minorities in a pre-treatment 
setting.  
By virtue of conducting the experiment in areas with varying levels of previous intergroup 
conflict, we further identify a role for the history of intergroup conflict in shaping the effectiveness 
of minority group leaders. Comparing coordination across arms within each district, so that district-
specific unobservable characteristics do not contaminate our findings, we find that a history of 
intergroup conflict has a detrimental effect on the effectiveness of minority (Muslim) leaders under 
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all policy regimes. Specifically, AA decreases Muslim leader effectiveness significantly in high 
conflict areas and intergroup contact increases Muslim leader effectiveness only in low conflict 
areas. In contrast, conflict history does not significantly influence Hindu leader effectiveness. 
Our study makes a unique contribution by connecting the literature on leader identity and 
policy outcomes with the literature on leadership and coordination and introducing the relevance 
of social identity in achieving coordination. Previous work on leader identity typically identifies 
the combined impact of leader preferences (or actions) and citizen reactions.3 Our experimental 
design uniquely allows us to isolate citizen reactions, and we find that they are a very important 
determinant of leader effectiveness. Our focus on coordination provides a measure of the aggregate 
economic impact of leader identity, in contrast to previous work that has tended to focus on 
whether leaders redistribute public goods or transfers towards their own group (Pande, 2003; 
Burgess et al., 2015). Further, our study reveals that citizen reactions to leader identity can be 
changed by commonly implemented policies such as AA or intergroup contact, with important 
implications for the success of these policies. No previous work has investigated the effectiveness 
of these policies as a function of leader identity. Finally, we contribute novel evidence on the 
relevance of conflict history, a marker of intergroup hostility, in shaping the effectiveness of 
leaders and of policies.4 Overall, our work pushes forward the frontier on the open question of 
 
3 Many papers have examined the impact of a politician’s personal identity (gender, ethnicity, 
caste, religion) on policy outcomes (see Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Chin and Prakash, 2011; 
Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014; Bhalotra et al., 2014; Brollo and Troiano, 2016; Bhavnani, 
2017; Bhalotra et al., 2019). Citizen-candidate models (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and 
Coate, 1997) allow leader identity to affect policy outcomes, in contrast to Downsian models 
where only the identity of the median voter matters. 
4 Previous research primarily focuses on the origins of conflict (see Blattman and Miguel, 2010, 
for a review) and its impact on growth (Rodrick, 1999), credit markets (Fisman et al., 2020), human 
capital (Miguel and Roland, 2011) and cooperation (see Bauer et al., 2016 for a review). 
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what makes some leaders more effective than others (Brandts et al., 2007; Brandts et al., 2015; 
Weber et al., 2001).   
Our study also takes forward the experimental literature on coordination failure. While 
previous laboratory experimental evidence suggests that leaders are effective in improving 
economic outcomes (Guth et al., 2007; Levy et al., 2011; Brandts et al., 2015; Jack and Recalde, 
2015; Brandts et al., 2016; Heursen et al., 2019), we provide the first evidence that leadership 
effects on coordination are significantly mediated by social identity in diverse societies. No 
previous research has examined how the effectiveness of leaders may be modified by policies 
designed to promote minority group representation or assimilate minorities. Previous leader-
coordination studies have almost entirely been conducted in the laboratory, and the few studies of 
coordination games in the field have not investigated the role of leaders (Brooks et al., 2018; Afridi 
et al., 2020; Polania-Reyes and Echeverry, 2020). Our implementation of the coordination game 
in the field enables us to use real social identities rather than lab-assigned identities, to conduct the 
analysis in a developing country where strong formal institutions to enable coordination are less 
present, and to investigate how past conflict influences group behavior. 
We contribute to the literature on AA policies, first by identifying that they can hamper 
coordination by priming majority group identity and, second, by analyzing religious identities, the 
existing literature having been dominated by gender quotas.5 Of particular interest here are 
Gangadharan et al. (2016) and Bagues et al. (2017), who find that male identity is primed by gender 
quotas and committee-level exposure to women respectively, results similar to our findings that 
Hindu identity is primed by quotas for Muslim leaders and by intergroup contact with Muslims. 
Similarly, no previous paper has analyzed the effectiveness of intergroup contact in improving 
 
5 Many papers have examined how gender quotas influence policy outcomes, gender norms, 
women’s aspirations and political participation (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009; Beaman et al., 2009; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Beaman et al., 2012; Iyer et al., 
2012; Matsa and Miller, 2013). Experimental research has primarily focused on whether gender 
quotas encourage women to take part in tournaments (Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012; Niederle et al., 
2013; Leibbrandt et al., 2018). 
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coordination, nor how this varies with leader identity (and conflict history). A previous literature 
on intergroup contact finds that contact can change attitudes and prejudice towards the out-group, 
including in the case of anti-Muslim prejudice in India (Barnhardt, 2009).6 We differ by measuring 
group coordination outcomes rather than individual attitudes, noting that coordination takes into 
account others’ actions and attitudes.  
Finally, we contribute to research in psychology, sociology and economics showing that social 
identity affects individual economic choices, and that the influence of identity on behavior varies 
with primes that make group identity salient (see, among others, Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; 
Benjamin et al., 2016; Hungerman, 2014; Chen and Chen, 2011). We take this literature forward 
by studying group outcomes rather than individual economic choices, using real identities rather 
than laboratory-primed ones, and assessing the impact of different policy regimes on identity 
priming.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides contextual information and 
describes the data collection. Section 3 delineates the experimental design. Section 4 lays out a 
theoretical framework to structure and interpret our results, Sections 5 and 6 present the empirical 
results, and Section 7 concludes. 
2. Context, Site Selection and Subject Recruitment  
India is a religiously diverse country, with Hindus constituting the majority religion (79.8% of 
the population in the 2011 census) and Muslims forming the largest religious minority (14.2% of 
the population). Compared to the Hindu majority, Muslims in India are less educated, more likely 
to live in urban areas and more likely to be victims of inter-religious violence. Relative to their 
population share, Muslims are under-represented in political office, the police and the judiciary 
(see Appendix B1 for details). 
We conducted field work with 1028 subjects across 44 towns from four districts in Uttar 
Pradesh, India’s largest state with more than 200 million inhabitants. Each district-pair was 
 
6 Allport (1954) articulates the potential effects of intergroup contact, and Paluck et al. (2019) 
review the empirical literature. Only a few recent studies use random assignment of groups to 
examine intergroup contact in a developing country setting (Corno et al., 2018; Lowe, 2020; Rao, 
2019; Scacco and Warren, 2018).  
 
8  
composed of one high conflict and one low conflict district. The 44 towns were randomly assigned 
to three different treatment arms: 14 towns were retained as control, and 15 each were assigned to 
the intergroup contact and the affirmative action treatments (Appendix Table A1). The assignment 
was performed within each district (implicitly stratifying by high/low conflict status); we further 
stratified by Muslim population proportion and total population. We then recruited study 
participants from both Hindu and Muslim sections of each town. Participants’ religion was 
identified from their names by our research assistants and verified using the pre-experiment 
questionnaire (see Appendix B2 for details of site selection and subject recruitment). Participants 
were given no information about the identities of other participants in the experiment. 
3. Experimental Design  
Each experimental session contained a pre-experiment survey and three tasks: a puzzle task, a 
weakest link coordination task (run across six rounds), and a social norms elicitation task. Out of 
the three tasks, one was chosen randomly for payment. The average payoff was ₹ 610 including a 
₹ 200 show up fee. This constitutes about 2.5 days’ wage for a semi-skilled laborer. The session 
concluded with a survey of attitudes and respondent characteristics. Subjects knew that the session 
had multiple stages but were not given instructions about any particular stage until reaching that 
stage (see Appendix B3 for complete experiment instructions). 
3.1. Pre-Experiment Survey and Puzzle Task. Prior to commencement of the incentivized tasks, 
subjects answered a brief survey about their personal characteristics, namely height, eye color, hair 
color and religion. The questionnaire was primarily designed to check the religion of the 
participant (see layout in Appendix B3), and other questions were included to avoid making the 
research question explicitly salient, which might induce socially desirable response bias or 
experimenter demand effects. Using surveys and lists to make identity implicitly salient without 
making it explicitly salient is standard procedure in the identity salience literature (Steele and 
Aronson, 1995; Shih et al., 1999; Benjamin et al., 2016; Cohn et al., 2015). While it is difficult to 
know how participant responses would change if they were explicitly aware that the experiment 
was about religion, we should note that all subjects filled out the same questionnaire. So, even if 
the questionnaire made the religious focus of our research explicitly salient, this would be the same 
across different types of leaders or different policy arms. 
After the pre-experiment survey, all subjects participated in a 12-piece jigsaw puzzle task. 
Participants completed the task individually in the control and affirmative action treatment groups, 
 
9  
and in pairs in the intergroup contact treatment group. Our objective was to suppress 
competitiveness and have cooperative intergroup contact, since the latter has been shown to reduce 
prejudice (Paluck et al., 2019; Lowe, 2020). The time given for the puzzle assembly was twelve 
minutes and almost all participants were able to complete the task successfully in this time.  
3.2. Weakest Link Coordination Task. The task structure is closely related to the minimum effort 
corporate turnaround game designed by Brandts et al. (2006), which is based on the minimum 
effort or weakest link coordination game of Van Huyck et al. (1990). It was conducted after the 
puzzle task.  
3.2.1. Group Formation. Individuals were assigned to four-member groups (each called a “firm”), 
comprised of two Hindu and two Muslim “employees.” Participants did not know, nor could they 
observe, who the other three in their group were. We did not provide information to participants 
on the identity of their group members, and they were explicitly told that the people sitting on their 
mat were not part of their firm.  
3.2.2. Effort Choices and Payoffs. The task is run across six periods. In each period employees 
decide how many hours (x) to devote to firm activities. Their choices vary between 0 and 20 in 
intervals of 5: !! ∈ {0,5,10,15,20}. It is noteworthy that choices are not actual hours worked but 
effort choices with payoff consequences. Employees’ payoffs for each period depend negatively 
on their own effort choice and positively on the minimum effort of all individuals in the group:  
(1) pi = 500 – 25xi + [min (xi, X-i) * 40] 
where xi is player i’s own effort (number of hours) and X-i is the vector of all other players’ effort 
choices. The payoff table is illustrated in Appendix Table A3, where the units are Indian rupees 
(1USD ≈ ₹68). Participants were shown the payoff table but not the payoff equation. Under this 
payoff structure, coordinating on any of the available effort levels is a Nash equilibrium.  
Note that it is only worthwhile for profit maximizing employees to raise their own effort level 
if this will increase the minimum effort of the firm.7 Given this, previous work has found that play 
often evolves towards the payoff-dominated equilibrium in which all players choose the lowest 
 
7 For a profit maximizing employee to increase their effort by 1 unit e.g. from 0 to 5 hours, they 
must believe there is an 85.5% probability that each of the other three employees increase their 
effort. To derive this probability, we solve for p where 500 = 375(1 − 1") + 575(1"). 
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possible effort level (Brandts et al., 2006). The task is split into two stages. The first stage repeats 
the coordination game described above across four periods (rounds). Employees work in the same 
firm across all periods. At the end of each period subjects are informed of the firm’s minimum 
effort. Employees are never informed of individual firm members’ effort choices. The first stage 
is designed to induce coordination on an inefficient equilibrium with low levels of effort, which 
we label “coordination failure” (Brandts et al., 2015).  
3.2.3. Leader Assignment. The second stage introduces a leader, and runs for two further periods. 
The leader’s role within each firm is to suggest a non-binding number of hours to work. Leaders 
do not have the scope to communicate with their employees beyond proposing an effort level, 
similar to other papers in the “leading by example” literature (Güth et al., 2007, Gächter et al., 
2012; Levy et al., 2011). All leaders are appointed and participants cannot elect or change the 
leader. Firm employees are informed of the leader’s proposal, but not the actual effort choice of 
the leader. Employees are also provided information about the characteristics of their firm leader 
taken from the pre-experiment survey, namely height, eye color, hair color and religion. The only 
characteristic that varies across leaders is their religion.  
Half of the firms in each session are assigned Hindu leaders and half are assigned Muslim 
leaders. Leader identity is randomly allocated, and the player in each group who will be the leader 
is also randomly selected conditional on their religion. Our estimates for the impact of introducing 
a leader are thus specific to leader identity. It is important to remember that the religious 
composition of firms is the same across all firms, regardless of the leader’s religion. Participant 
characteristics with regard to demographics, education, income and religiosity are balanced across 
groups with Hindu or Muslim leaders (Appendix Table A4). Leader characteristics other than 
religion, in particular, gender, age, and family income are balanced across Hindus and Muslims, 
though Muslim leaders are less likely to have gone to college and more likely to pray several times 
a day, similar to the overall population.  
After being informed of the leader’s effort proposal and leader characteristics at the start of the 
fifth period, similar to the earlier periods, employees are informed of their group’s minimum effort 
in the previous period. All employees including the leader must then decide how many hours to 
work. The leader’s effort, just like the effort of other employees, is not visible to the group. The 
coordination game is repeated for two periods with the same leader, but with a new effort proposal 
by the leader in each period.  If this task is selected for payment, players are paid their coordination 
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game payoffs from two randomly selected periods. We have two additional treatment arms 
(described below) where the same weakest link game is played, but with changes to the 
environment in which the leaders operate, designed to mimic commonly proposed policy 
interventions.  
3.2.4. Affirmative Action (AA) Treatment. Affirmative action policies, such as quotas, are 
common in both government and business to increase participation of disadvantaged or minority 
groups. As described earlier, 15 of our 44 towns were randomly assigned into an AA treatment 
arm. The game is conducted exactly as in the control arm described above, with one important 
exception. Upon the introduction of a leader at the beginning of period 5, subjects are told that 
“similar to many government positions, 50% of the leadership positions in this game will be 
reserved. Reservation will be made based on some characteristic in the initial survey.”  
Along with information on the leader’s characteristics (height, eye color, hair color, religion), 
employees with a Muslim (Hindu) leader are also informed that their leader is in a reserved 
(unreserved) position.8 While participants are not explicitly told that the reservation is based on 
religion, about 70% of respondents in the post-experiment survey correctly identified that the 
reservation was done on the basis of religion, with the rest citing other leader characteristics or 
saying “don’t know.”9 It is important to reiterate that here, as in the control arm, by design all 
groups contain two Hindu and two Muslim participants. By comparing the control and the AA 
treatment arms (and thus effectively comparing a Muslim leader with a Muslim leader who is 
leading through a quota), we can measure whether people behave differently when they believe 
their leader is in a position due to an affirmative action policy. In our setting, AA does not change 
the composition of leaders, it only makes the reservation policy salient in participants’ minds.  
3.2.5. Intergroup Contact Treatment. We also investigate the impact of a randomized intervention 
that increases intergroup contact on citizen responses to leaders of different religious identity.  The 
key difference between this treatment and the control arm is the implementation of the puzzle task. 
 
8 Leadership positions could in theory also be reserved for Hindus. However, we do not analyze 
this possibility since we are not aware of the existence of such a policy in any part of India.  




Unlike in the control arm and AA treatment, where puzzles are assembled individually, subjects 
in the contact treatment assemble the jigsaw puzzle with a partner from the other religion. The 
puzzle partner is a person sitting on the same mat as the participant, and therefore not a member 
of the same firm (see Appendix Figure A3). Subjects are encouraged to talk with their partner 
during the 12 minutes allowed for the puzzle. By comparing outcomes across the control and the 
contact treatment arm, we can infer whether intergroup contact changes the impact of leader 
identity on coordination. 
Subjects in the sample towns often live in separate Hindu and Muslim neighborhoods, which 
limits interaction between the two communities. Nevertheless, our survey confirms that only 14% 
of participants incorrectly identified the religion of their puzzle partner.  A potential concern is 
that interacting with anyone, not necessarily from a different religion, prior to the coordination 
game may affect coordination. As we shall see below, we can reject this concern because we see 
no differences in minimum effort in the contact vs the control arms in the periods before the leader 
is introduced. 
3.3. Norms Elicitation Task 
To measure Hindu and Muslim religious norms we follow Krupka and Weber (2013) and 
Gangadharan et al. (2016) and conduct a social norms coordination task. Participants are asked a 
set of questions related to behavior in the weakest link coordination task. Participants are asked to 
rate the social appropriateness of a Hindu or Muslim employee working 0, 10 or 20 hours under a 
Hindu or Muslim leader. Appropriateness ratings are measured on a 4-point ordered scale, 
consisting of the following options: very socially inappropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate, 
somewhat socially appropriate and very socially appropriate. These questions can thus be used to 
evaluate what people within our sample towns believe are the appropriate behaviors between 
Muslims and Hindus.   
4. Theoretical Framework  
In order to explain our results, we describe a stylized theoretical framework to help us 
understand the role of leader identity in changing individual behavior and hence the group outcome 
in the coordination game. Specifically, our model incorporates the role of citizen reactions to leader 
identity in shaping aggregate outcomes. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) introduced the role of identity 
in economic decision making. In a setting broadly related to ours, Benjamin et al (2016) show that 
priming religious identity can change individual economic choices, but utility maximization in 
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their model does not involve strategic interactions as in our coordination game. We build on an 
extensive reputational literature by introducing “behavioral types”—players who choose their 
effort based not only on their economic payoff but also on leader identity. Rational players, in 
contrast, maximize their payoff, taking into account the presence of behavioral types. As is 
standard in the reputational literature, we assume that behavioral types constitute only a tiny 
fraction of the population.  
 Recall that individuals in our field experiment are either Hindus or Muslims, and four players 
are randomly chosen from the population to constitute a group. Individuals do not know the 
identity or religion of other individuals in their group. The group plays the coordination game as 
described earlier, with individuals choosing among possible effort choices over a continuum 
[0,W].10 All players selecting any effort level in this range produces a Nash equilibrium. We 
assume that in situations where there is no leader, all individuals will use the concept of risk-
dominance as an equilibrium selection device in the coordination game. This means that players 
have uniform beliefs over the others’ effort strategies and that this guides their own effort choice. 
This assumption is similar to that made in coordination games with investment decisions under 
incomplete information.11 The coordination game payoff is maximized when the individual player 
matches the minimum effort of the other players. So, the optimal effort choice involves calculating 
the expected value of the minimum of the other three players. Under the risk-dominant criterion, 
players assume that all the other players are randomizing uniformly over [0,5], and hence the 
equilibrium effort choice can be calculated as !∗ = $% . 
The optimization is different for behavioral individuals.  Behavioral individuals will follow the 
leader’s proposal if the leader is from their own religion and will choose effort level !∗	when the 
leader is from the other religion. We assume that the leader’s proposal will be greater than the 
 
10 In our experiment, we have discrete effort choices for ease of implementation in the field.  
11 See the literature on equilibrium selection and global games (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993; 
Morris, Shin and Yildiz, 2016). 
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minimum effort in the no-leader equilibrium !∗, which is true in our data.12 Rational players will 
choose an effort level that optimizes their coordination game payoffs, keeping the responses of 
behavioral types in mind. A fraction 8& of Hindu individuals are behavioral types, as are a fraction 
8' among Muslims. The overall fraction of behavioral types in the population is thus 89 ≔ 18' +
(1 − 1)8&, where 1 is the population share of Muslims. 8& 	and	8' are small enough that the 
probability of more than one behavioral individual in a group of 3 or 4 is close to zero, so that 
rational players can behave as though there is at most one behavioral player in the rest of the 
group.13 
The optimal effort choices for a rational player when there is a Hindu leader (!&), and when 
there is a Muslim leader (!'), can then be derived as follows:  
(2)																!& = (1 − 89)"!∗ + 3(1 − 89)( >(1 − 1)8&
$
" + 18'!
∗∗?   
(3)																!' = (1 − 89)"!∗ + 3(1 − 89)( @18'
$
" + (1 − 1)8&!
∗∗A  
Here the first term reflects the probability of all three other players being rational (and the optimal 
choice is therefore !∗); the second term is the expected optimal choice under the assumption of 
one player in the group being behavioral. Under Hindu leaders, if the behavioral player is Hindu 
(which happens with probability (1 − 1)8&), that player will follow the leader and choose effort 
above !∗, and hence the rational player only needs to match the expected minimum effort of the 
other two rational players, which is 
$
" 	(> !
∗). On the other hand, if the behavioral player is 
Muslim (which happens with probability 18'), that player chooses !∗.	Then the rational player 
needs to match the expected minimum value of !∗ and the choices of the other two players, which 








∗. A similar logic applies to computation of !' . 
Examination of equations (2) and (3) tells us that optimal effort in the presence of a leader 
will be higher than the optimal effort without a leader only under certain conditions, and that the 
 
12 Less than 2% of all leader proposals in rounds 5 and 6 are lower than the minimum group effort 
in round 4 (prior to leader identity being announced). 
13 If 89 is 0.10, then the probability of more than one behavioral player is only 5.23% in a group of 
size 4 and 2.8% in a group of size 3. If 89 is 0.05, these probabilities are 1.4% and 0.7% respectively.  
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change in optimal effort will depend on the identity of the leader as well as the fraction of 
behavioral individuals in each religion. This is a contribution we make to the coordination 
literature that typically overlooks social diversity within groups.  
We can be more specific in our predictions: as long as 18' 	is sufficiently greater than 
(1 − 1)8& , minimum group effort will be higher under Muslim leaders after leader identity is 
made public, and the increase in minimum group effort under Muslim leaders (compared to the 
situation without a leader) will be greater than the increase in minimum group effort under Hindu 
leaders. Note that one way this sufficient condition is satisfied is if the fraction of behavioral types 
among Muslims (8')	is much greater than the fraction among Hindus (8&). This is likely to be 
the case, since previous literature has established that members of population minority groups are 
more likely to display “in-group bias” and majority groups are unlikely to do so (Bisin and Verdier, 
2001; Gupta et al, 2018; Berge et al., 2019). We now proceed to test these hypotheses using the 
data from our field experiment. 
5. The Impact of Leader Identity on Coordination Outcomes 
5.1. Regression Specification 
Our main outcome variable is the minimum effort exerted in the group in each round. This is 
the key determinant of player payoffs and is the standard measure of coordination in the weakest 
link literature. We test whether leaders improve coordination by estimating the following 
specification: 
(4)   EFGHIJK1LMMJIN-./ = O + PQR8SRI-./ + H-.
0 T + U-./ ; t=1,2,…6 
where MinGroupEffortkjt is the minimum effort exerted by group k in town j in period t, and 
Leaderkjt is a dummy variable that takes value one for periods 5 and 6, when a leader is introduced. 
This regression therefore compares the group’s minimum effort in periods with a leader to periods 
without a leader. Gkj is a suite of control variables that includes town fixed effects, demographic 
controls (average age, education, gender mix and monthly household income of the group 
members) and a control for religiosity based on prayer frequency. Standard errors are clustered at 
the group level to account for within-group correlation in outcomes across different periods.  
We run specification (4) separately for Hindu and Muslim leaders to test whether leader 
identity matters in achieving better coordination. Since comparisons between later and earlier 
rounds maybe influenced by round effects and because our main interest is in the comparison 
between Hindu and Muslims (where pre-leader rounds have similar rates of coordination) we also 
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run a regression on the combined data, and include an interaction term QR8SRI-./ ∗
EKWXFYQR8SRI-./ in order to test whether the increase in minimum effort under Muslim leaders 
is higher than under Hindu leaders. Recall that half of all groups within each town are randomly 
assigned to have Muslim leaders. We also run a robustness test in which we restrict the analysis to 
periods 5 and 6, and control for the group-specific minimum effort in period 4 and the leader’s 
proposals in periods 5 and 6. This enables us to test whether the impact of the policies can be 
attributed to differences in the leader’s proposal, or to differences across groups in the coordination 
outcome in previous rounds.  
5.2. Leader Identity and Coordination in the Control Group 
Consistent with the corporate turnaround game literature, we find that groups coordinate on 
the low-effort equilibrium in the absence of a leader, which we call “coordination failure.” The 
average minimum group effort is less than three hours at the end of period 4 (Figure 1A). We find 
that introducing Muslim leaders significantly improves minimum group effort in periods 5 and 6 
(Figure 1A). The efficiency gain in Muslim-led groups is large: minimum group effort increases 
by 1.07 hours, compared to the pre-leader average of 3.45 hours in periods 1 through 4 (Table 1, 
column 1).14 The estimates are robust to controlling for the demographic and religious 
characteristics of group members, consistent with our randomized assignment of leader identity 
(column 3). In contrast, the introduction of Hindu leaders does not improve minimum group effort 
(Figure 1A), leading to a statistically insignificant decline of 0.488 hours (Table 1, column 2). The 
difference in coordination gains between Muslim and Hindu leaders is statistically significant 
(column 5). Our results are consistent with a higher expected fraction of behavioral types among 
Muslims-- our model predicts that Muslim leaders will have a bigger impact than Hindu leaders in 
this situation. 
The results are robust to using town random effects instead of town fixed effects, using an 
ordered probit specification rather than OLS, and to controlling for town*mat fixed effects to 
 
14 The effect of Muslim leadership on minimum effort is lower than in the lab experiment of 
Brandts et al. (2015), which could be due to differences in the context (developed country lab 
experiment vs developing country field setting) or because leaders in our experiment could only 
communicate a numerical proposal rather than more detailed messages to participants.  
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ensure that participants are correctly responding to the effort choices of their firm members rather 
than the effort choices of those seated on the same mat during the experiment. In a post-game 
survey, we elicited each participant’s trust of people of the other religion by asking whether they 
would like to have a neighbor of a different religion. We find no evidence that our results are 
driven by differences in cross-religion trust, see Appendix Table A10. 
5.3. Mechanism: Citizen Reactions to Leader Identity 
 Our model generates predictions based on individual responses to leader identity (among the 
“behavioral types”) and other players’ optimal strategies in light of these expected reactions. We 
show that our results cannot be explained by alternative hypotheses, such as the reactions to leader 
proposals or to the perceived competence of leaders. First, we verify that our results cannot be 
explained by differences in leader proposals. Our data reveal that Muslim leaders propose 10.5 
hours on average, compared to 9.4 hours for Hindu leaders (Appendix Table A5). This difference 
is not statistically significant (Appendix Table A6, column 1), and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
shows that the distributions of proposals by leader identity are not statistically different (p value= 
0.452; Appendix Figure A4). We confirmed that the significantly different results under Muslim 
leaders compared to Hindu leaders hold even when we control for leader proposals and for 
minimum effort in period 4 by restricting the sample to periods 5 and 6 (Table 1, column 6). 
Second, we find that our results are not driven by perceptions of higher competence of Muslim 
leaders, by greater or lesser exposure to real-life Muslim leaders, or by beliefs about the hours 
worked by the leader (see Appendix Table A7).  
We now show two pieces of evidence consistent with our theoretical framework. Our 
theoretical framework predicts that we should see increased effort in Muslim-led groups when 
18' is sufficiently greater than (1 − 1)8&. When is this more likely to happen? Based on previous 
research, we expect a lower fraction of Muslim behavioral type individuals (8') in towns where 
Muslims form a higher fraction of the population, i.e. where 1 is high. This means that the 
inequality is less likely to be satisfied when 1 is very high or very low, and more likely to be 
satisfied at intermediate values of 1. In Appendix Figure A5, we graph the increase in minimum 
effort under Muslim leaders against the town’s Muslim population share. The results are in line 
with this prediction, namely that towns with very high or very low Muslim population share show 
smaller increases. This is suggestive rather than conclusive as, with a small number of towns, the 
differences are not statistically significant.  
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Importantly, we show that our results are consistent with the extent to which individuals expect 
others to react to leader identity. As part of the social norms task, we asked respondents to rate (on 
a scale of 1 to 4, with 4 being the highest) how “socially appropriate” others would consider it to 
be for a Hindu or Muslim employee to choose the maximum effort level under a Hindu or a Muslim 
leader. We find that Hindu subjects rate a maximum effort as less “socially appropriate” from a 
Muslim employee when faced with a Hindu leader instead of a Muslim leader, a statistically 
significant difference (Appendix Table A8, panel A).  In other words, Hindus expect Muslims to 
significantly change their behavior based upon leader identity. In contrast, Muslim employees do 
not expect any difference in effort from themselves under Hindu vs Muslim leaders. They do rate 
Hindus providing maximum effort under Muslim leaders to be less socially appropriate than under 
Hindu leaders, but the difference is not statistically significant (Appendix Table A8, panel B).  
Given this structure of beliefs, our model predicts that rational Hindu employees are much less 
likely to increase effort under Hindu leaders (since they are more likely to expect the Muslims to 
be “behavioral”), as compared to Muslim employees under Hindu leaders. The reverse is unlikely 
to be true, since Muslim subjects do not assign a statistically different rating to Hindu employees’ 
appropriateness under different leaders. We can investigate these predictions by examining how 
individual effort decisions respond to leader identity: 
(5) ZGSF[FSK8XLMMJIN!-./ = 8 + \QR8SRI-./ + H!-.0 ] + ^!-./; t = 1,2,…,6 
where IndividualEffortikjt is the effort choice of individual i in group k (of town j) and period t. As 
before, Gikj includes town fixed effects, demographic controls and religion, and standard errors are 
clustered at the group level. Note that individual effort choices depend not only on their 
expectations of how other individuals in the group will react to the leader’s proposal and the 
leader’s identity, but also the individual’s own reaction to leader identity (if they are a behavioral 
type).  
Consistent with our model predictions, we find that Hindu employees show a decline in effort 
when a Hindu leader is introduced, while Muslim employees do not show any significant change 
in effort (Table 2, columns 1 and 2). The difference in response between Hindu and Muslim 
employees is significant at the 10% level. In contrast, Muslim employees exhibit a statistically 
significant increase in effort under Muslim leaders, while Hindu employees show a non-significant 
increase in effort (Table 2, columns 3 and 4). However, the difference between Hindu and Muslim 
employee response to a Muslim leader is not statistically significant. To summarize, our 
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investigations indicate that our main finding, that Muslim leaders induce greater coordination 
towards Pareto-superior equilibria, is primarily driven by citizen reactions that are shaped by 
expectations of Muslims having stronger in-group bias (i.e., they are more likely to expect the 
Muslims to be behavioral). 
6. Coordination Responses to Leader Identity under Policy Assignment 
6.1. Regression Specification 
We examine whether leader effectiveness varies across policy environments by comparing 
coordination outcomes for a given leader identity across the different treatment groups as follows: 
(6)	EFGHIJK1LMMJIN-./=b0 
+	P*QR8SRI-./+	P(QR8SRI-./*` .̀+	P"QR8SRI-./*aJGN8bN.+	c-.
0 T + U-./  ; t = 1,2,…,6 
In equation (6), AAj is a dummy that equals one if town j was randomly assigned to the affirmative 
action treatment and Contactj equals one if the town was randomly assigned to the contact 
treatment. We estimate equation (6) separately for Muslim and Hindu leaders. P* then captures the 
impact of the leader on coordination in the control arm, P( estimates the differential impact of the 
leader in an AA environment and P" estimates the differential impact of the leader in an 
environment with pre-game contact between members of the different religions. 
6.2. Affirmative Action 
Our empirical results show that affirmative action (AA) policies, a commonly suggested 
solution to improve integration and opportunities for minorities, can in fact strongly reduce the 
effectiveness of minority leaders. Minimum effort increases by a statistically insignificant 0.227 
hours (1.067-0.840) under Muslim leaders (Table 3, column 1). In contrast, minimum group effort 
increases by a large and statistically significant 2.391 hours under Hindu leaders (column 2).  
Our model suggests that this may result from an increase in the expectation that Hindus 
include behavioral types (8&),	which would lead to increased minimum effort under Hindu leaders. 
This will be more likely to happen if 8& increases so much that the sufficient condition for our 
hypothesis is reversed, i.e. (1 − 1)8& ≫ 18'. Such a change in behavior is consistent with 
previous research which finds that AA policies result in a strengthening of in-group bias among 
AA non-recipients (Gangadharan et al., 2016 show this in the context of gender quotas in India). 
This effect is likely to be heightened in contexts where people believe that quota recipients are not 
suitable for leadership roles because they are less skilled or not truly disadvantaged (Ip et al., 
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2020). To investigate the behavior of Muslim and Hindu individuals, we examine individual effort 




g + e!-./  ; t = 1,2,…,6 
Our estimates show that Hindu employees chose significantly higher effort levels in Hindu-led 
groups under the AA treatment compared to the control group i.e. f2 > 0 (Appendix Table A9, 
column 4). The results are sharper when we restrict to periods 5 and 6, and include controls for the 
leader’s proposal and for minimum group effort in the pre-leader period, similar to columns 3 and 
4 of Table 3. We see that both Hindu and Muslim employees reduce effort under Muslim leaders 
in the AA environment compared to the control group (Appendix Table A9, columns 5 and 6). 
Similarly, both Hindu and Muslim employees increase effort under Hindu leaders in the AA 
environment (columns 7 and 8). The change in effort is statistically significant only for Hindu 
employees but the fact that effort choices of both sorts of citizens move in the same direction is 
consistent with a generalized perception of greater 8& and lower 8' under AA. The higher 
response of Hindu employees to Hindu and Muslim leaders is consistent with a greater fraction of 
behavioral types among Hindus under AA. 
As with the control group results, we verify that these differences do not arise because of 
differences in leader proposals across treatment arms. Muslim leaders do not make statistically 
different proposals from Hindu leaders across any of the treatment arms (Appendix Table A6, 
column 2). To address the possible concern that the groups assigned to the different policy 
environments undergo different rates of learning over the course of the game, we restrict the 
estimation sample to the last two periods and control for leader proposals and minimum effort in 
the previous period of the game, period 4 (Table 3, columns 3 and 4). The concern is allayed, and 
the coefficients on Leader*AA are now statistically significant for both Muslim and Hindu leaders.  
6.3. Intergroup Contact 
Another common policy to improve integration is to encourage interaction between groups. 
We find that intergroup contact improves minimum group effort under both Muslim and Hindu 
leaders compared to the control group, but the difference is larger for Hindu leaders. For Muslim 
leaders, intergroup contact increases minimum group effort by an additional 1.007 hours compared 
to the control group, but this difference is not statistically significant (Table 3, column 1). Under 
Hindu leaders, intergroup contact results in a large and statistically significant increase of 2.755 
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hours of minimum group effort, compared to the control group (column 2). This difference 
counterbalances the better performance of Muslim leaders in the control group--minimum group 
effort in the contact treatment is almost the same across Muslim and Hindu leaders (see Figures 
1B and 1C).  
This result in the context of our framework, corresponds to an increase in both 8& and 8', and 
a particularly large increase in 8& . In other words, both Hindus and Muslims are more responsive 
to leader identity after intergroup contact, but the effect is stronger for Hindu individuals. 
Examining potential mechanisms and in particular individual effort again, we find no significant 
increase in individual effort levels under Muslim leaders, but a strong and significant increase in 
individual effort for both Hindus and Muslims under Hindu leaders (Appendix Table A9, columns 
5-8). Our results suggest that expectation of change in Hindu behavior after contact with Muslims 
is higher than the expectations of change in Muslim behavior after contact with Hindus. This 
asymmetry probably arises because Muslims are a minority community overall, and hence 
interactions with Hindus may be more common for them than the reverse. The mechanism our 
results indicate—namely the increase in identity-based response—is different from that 
emphasized in previous research on intergroup contact which has focused on whether such contact 
can reduce prejudice or affect attitudes such as pro-sociality, trust or egalitarianism (Rao, 2019, 
Finseraas et al. 2020, Paluck et al., 2019). 
As before, we verify that leader proposals are not driving our results. We again find no 
significant differences in leader proposals under intergroup contact compared to the control group 
(Appendix Table A6, column 2). The coefficients of interest are larger in magnitude and 
statistically significant after controlling for leader proposals (Table 3, columns 3 and 4). In fact, 
once we control for leader proposals, the improvement in coordination in Muslim-led groups 
becomes statistically significant.15   
6.4. Does Conflict History Matter? 
 
15 We also re-estimated equation (4) for the contact group participants, interacting leader with 
female puzzle partner. We find that participants with female puzzle partners do not respond 
differentially to the introduction of a leader (Appendix Table A11).  
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The results discussed so far average across areas with different histories of Hindu-Muslim 
conflict. In this section, we examine how the relationship between coordination outcomes and 
leader identity varies in the control vs treatment arms with whether the district had high or low 
exposure to intergroup conflict over the period 1980-2010. This is pertinent since such policies 
may be implemented to ameliorate historical grievances. The aim of this exercise is not to compare 
outcomes in high and low conflict areas directly, since many other observable and unobservable 
characteristics may differ across high conflict and low conflict areas. Instead, we take advantage 
of the fact that we randomly allocated towns to different treatments within districts characterized 
by high vs low conflict and we compare behavior across these randomized treatments within each 
conflict setting. Thus, we do not aim to identify the causal impact of conflict history, but rather the 
casual impact of the two policies under Muslim vs Hindu leaders across areas with different 
conflict histories.      
We find a consistent pattern of results that suggest a lower responsiveness of Muslims to leader 
identity in high conflict areas, and a higher responsiveness of Hindus to leader identity in those 
same areas (Figure 3). In particular, we see that the increases in minimum group effort under 
Muslim leaders are uniformly higher in low conflict areas for all the three policy environments 
(see Table 4, columns 1 and 2). In particular, this means that our earlier finding that Muslim leaders 
improve coordination in the control and contact treatments emerges mostly from low conflict areas 
(column 1), and there is a significant decline in coordination in the AA arm in high conflict areas 
(column 2). This is consistent with 8' being uniformly lower in high-conflict areas. One reason 
for this may be that Muslims are less willing to exercise their religious preferences precisely 
because of the history of religious conflict, in which existing evidence suggests that they are 
usually the victims (Mitra and Ray, 2014). 
The impact of Hindu leaders on coordination is less sensitive to conflict history, with the 
exception that coordination improvements in the contact arm are higher in high conflict areas 
(Table 4, columns 3 and 4). This is consistent with higher 8&, potentially because of behavioral 
type Hindu reactions to leader identity being primed by intergroup contact in areas where religious 
tensions are stronger. Our earlier findings that Hindu leaders do not improve coordination in the 
control arm, but do under both the AA and contact treatments, holds in high and low conflict areas. 
These results are robust to controlling for leader proposals, and thus are driven by citizen reactions 
to leader identity (Appendix Table A12). Overall, our results suggest that the history of intergroup 
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conflict matters for leader effectiveness and policy effectiveness. Of note is the result that AA, 
which often aims to increase leadership roles for minorities, may be detrimental for minority leader 
effectiveness. 
7. Conclusions 
We provide the first investigation of how leader effectiveness in achieving economic 
coordination in diverse societies varies with leader identity. We implemented a lab-in-field 
experiment in India’s largest state, where we randomly assigned towns to two policy treatments 
and a control group. The random assignment was stratified by district, to allow us to compare the 
impact of policy treatments across districts with a history of high vs low intergroup conflict.   
We find that minority leaders improve coordination (measured as minimum group effort), but 
majority leaders do not. This is primarily the result of citizen reactions to leader identity, rather 
than differences in leader actions. The mechanism driving citizen reactions appears to be higher 
expectations of responsiveness to leader identity among members of the minority group.  In 
contrast to the greater responsiveness of Muslims to leader identity in the control group, we find 
that identity-based responsiveness to leaders appears to increase for members of the majority group 
in the presence of policies designed to improve social integration of the minority group. In fact, 
the control group results are reversed under affirmative action that is perceived to assign leadership 
posts to Muslims, with coordination becoming higher under Hindu leaders. A policy of intergroup 
contact leads to higher coordination under all leaders, but the gains are larger under Hindu leaders. 
We find that social integration policies enable minority leaders to be more effective in low 
conflict areas. Specifically, in low conflict areas and only in low conflict areas, Muslim leaders 
serve to improve coordination outcomes in each of the three experimental arms. The effectiveness 
of Hindu leaders remains evident in the AA and contract arms but does not vary significantly by 
conflict history. 
Pulled together, our findings provide compelling evidence that social identity influences 
behavior in a way that leads to different economic choices than would emerge from maximization 
of individual economic payoffs. Our particular contribution is to demonstrate this in the context of 
leadership. We show that citizen reactions to leader identity influence coordination outcomes. In 
general, we find that the minority group shows stronger responsiveness to leader identity, except 
in areas with a history of intergroup conflict. However, policies designed to integrate minorities 
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tend to activate social identity responses in the majority group in ways that can potentially reduce 
the effectiveness of these policies.  
Our findings contribute novel evidence to research on leader identity, coordination failure, 
social integration policies and religious conflict, bridging key aspects of these domains of research. 
They provide unique evidence on the role of citizen reactions to leader identity in heterogeneous 
communities using a non-student sample. They further provide useful guidance for policy, 
identifying conditions under which leaders of minority vs majority groups may be constrained in 
resolving coordination problems.  
Our results suggest many directions for future research in field settings. These include allowing 
leaders to use unrestricted communications rather than specific proposals (as in Brandts et al., 
2016), examining whether raising the monetary stakes or changing group sizes affects leaders’ 
effectiveness, and whether our results for Hindus and Muslims in India generalize to other social 
majority or minority groups. Recent research suggests that social identity itself may be amenable 
to policy initiatives (Miguel, 2004; Blouin and Mukand, 2019). While this is beyond the scope of 
our paper, it can also be a fruitful direction for future research. 
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Table 1: Leader Identity and Minimum Effort (Control Group)  
Dependent variable: Minimum Effort in the Group      














              
Leader (Period>4) 1.067 -0.488 1.067 -0.488 -0.488  
 (0.494) (0.381) (0.508) (0.392) (0.379)  
Muslim Leader * (Period>4)     1.555  
     (0.620)  
Muslim Leader     -0.492 1.272 
     (0.616) (0.618) 
       
Observations 246 246 246 246 492 164 
R-squared 0.281 0.258 0.477 0.435 0.309 0.536 
Town FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Religious Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Experimental Controls No No No No No Yes 
       
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at group level. Demographic controls include gender, age, education and monthly 
household income; religious controls include dummies for whether the participant prays several times a day or once a day; 
experimental controls include the leader's proposal and the group minimum effort in period 4. Columns 1-5 include data 






Table 2: Leader Identity and Individual Effort (Control Group) 
  
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
 Individual Effort 










Leader (Period>4) 0.015 -1.156  1.157 0.377 
 (0.517) (0.408)  (0.434) (0.531) 
      
p-value (M employee = H 
employee) [0.093]  [0.281] 
      
      
Observations 486 480  486 498 
R-squared 0.242 0.280  0.309 0.278 
Town FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Demographic Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Religious Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
      
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at group level. Demographic controls include gender, 
age, education and monthly household income; religious controls include dummies for whether 
the participant prays several times a day or once a day. Data includes effort choices of both 





Table 3: Policy Environments and Leader Effectiveness 
    
       
Dependent variable: Minimum Effort in the Group        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Muslim Leaders Hindu Leaders Muslim Leaders Hindu Leaders 
          
Leader (b1) 1.067 -0.488     
  (0.495) (0.382)     
Leader *AA (b2) -0.840 2.391 -1.625 2.370 
  (0.814) (0.671) (0.837) (0.627) 
Leader * Contact (b3) 1.007 2.755 1.738 2.850 
  (0.752) (0.651) (0.801) (0.676) 
          
p-value for b2 = b3 0.034 0.634 0.000 0.476 
          
Observations 774 768 258 256 
R-squared 0.258 0.340 0.365 0.399 
Town FE Yes Yes No No 
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Religious Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Experimental Controls No No Yes Yes 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at group level. "Leader" is a dummy that equals one for periods 5 and 6, 
when a leader has made a proposal in each group. Demographic controls include gender, age, education and 
monthly household income; religious controls include dummies for whether the participant prays several times a 
day or once a day; experimental controls include the leader's proposal and the group minimum effort in period 4. 
Columns 1 and 2 include data from all periods; Columns 3 and 4 are restricted to periods 5 and 6 only. Leader 
dummy is always equal to one in columns 3 and 4. b1, b2 and b3 are as defined in equation 6. 
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Table 4: Does a History of Conflict Matter for Leader Effectiveness  across Policy Environments? 
Dependent variable: Minimum Effort in the Group   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Muslim Leaders Muslim Leaders Hindu Leaders Hindu Leaders 
  Low Conflict Areas High Conflict Areas Low Conflict Areas High Conflict Areas 
Leader 1.181 0.978 -0.486 -0.489 
  (0.577) (0.770) (0.555) (0.537) 
Leader *AA 0.757 -2.176 2.236 2.520 
  (1.194) (1.036) (1.020) (0.912) 
Leader * Contact 2.014 0.320 1.663 3.470 
  (1.100) (1.027) (0.780) (0.939) 
          
Observations 336 438 330 438 
R-squared 0.417 0.282 0.401 0.328 
Town FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Religious Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at group level. "Leader" is a dummy that equals one for periods 5 and 6, when a 
leader has made a proposal in each group. Demographic controls include gender, age, education and monthly household 





Figure 1: Leader Identity and Minimum Group Effort in Different Policy Environments 
 
                                                              
The figure shows the average minimum effort for groups with Muslim leaders and groups with Hindu leaders. Periods 1-4 are prior to 
leader assignment, periods 5 and 6 show outcomes after leader identity and leader proposals are revealed to participants.
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Figure 2: Leader Effectiveness Across Policy Environments and Conflict Histories  
                      
                     
The figure shows the average minimum effort for groups with Muslim leaders and groups with Hindu leaders. Periods 1-4 are prior to 
leader assignment, periods 5 and 6 show outcomes after leader identity and leader proposals are revealed to participants. 
